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Abstract. There are now thirty years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
German unification. A whole generation has since then grown up in Germany, 
who knows the period of division only from history books. The subject of 
German division should be over and done with by now – should it not? The 
current developments in Germany would indicate otherwise. Among these 
developments, the success of the party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in state 
elections has reminded us that significant differences persist between Eastern and 
Western Germany. This current finding is only an outward manifestation, 
however, of the dissatisfaction with the process of unification that still persists on 
the part of many East Germans. For a long time, little was heard on the topic in 
the public sphere, but it is still current and must be addressed publicly lest further 
potential social conflicts develop from it.  
The thesis of the present article is that the current differences between East and 
West Germans1 can no longer be explained merely by differences in socialization 
before 1989, but are also the manifestation of a West German culture of 
dominance arising in the course of the German unification and the ensuing 
process of transformation. This culture of dominance is based, as we will show in 
detail in the following, on a combination of economic, political and cultural 
dimensions. To examine this complex, I will draw on Rommelspacher’s (1995) 
concept of dominance culture. 
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THE CONCEPT OF DOMINANCE CULTURE 
 
The concept of dominance culture (Rommelspacher 1998, 2002) was 
originally developed in the context of women’s racism and 
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migration studies and builds theoretically on various sociological 
approaches to relations between different marginalized groups (e.g. 
Elias, Scotson 1990; Hall 1992) in modern societies (Baumann 
1992). Drawing on migration and racism studies, the concept goes 
beyond sociological analysis to expose in greater detail the 
psychological mechanisms that determine how and why members 
of different social groups in structural power relations communicate 
with one another as they do. 
The concept is based on the assumption of a modern society that 
identifies itself as a meritocracy of equals, promising potentially 
equal opportunity to all. This promise of equality cannot be fulfilled 
in reality, however; rather, a democratic society continuously 
produces and reproduces social inequality. The “claim of equality 
while reproducing inequality is a central contradiction in the modern 
Western2 world” (Rommelspacher 1998: 35; see also Foroutan 2019: 
28 ff.). Since real inequality is not a central part of the self-definition 
of modern societies, power relations tend to be obscured. “The 
classic model of repression, which makes a relatively clear 
distinction between the dominant and the oppressed”, 
Rommelspacher (1998: 23) writes, “progressively gives way in the 
course of the modern period to a structure in which power is located 
in the social agencies and in the normative orientations of the 
individuals. The seat of power is less clearly discernible; the relations 
of power become unclear and invisible”.  
Open hierarchies of power are supplanted by subtle dominances, 
which are broadly distributed in society, but which affect different 
social groups in different ways. In contrast to authoritarian rule, 
which is based “primarily on repression, on commands and 
prohibitions”, dominance can count on “broad acceptance” because 
it is “mediated by the social structures and the internalized norms, 
so that it reproduces political, social and economic hierarchies in a 
more inconspicuous way” (Rommelspacher 1998: 26). 
The establishment of such a social hierarchy takes place subtly 
and is “not even intentional on the part of many members of the 
majority” (Rommelspacher 2002: 18). Those who belong to a 
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“majority” are not fixed but can vary with different social situations. 
East Germans for example, whilst members of the majority culture 
in respect of their legal position (in contrast to immigrants), are at 
the same time in a marginalized position compared with West 
Germans (see below) in respect of their representation in the 
country’s elite positions or their representations in the media. When 
East Germans attack immigrants in East Germany, naturally those 
East Germans are in the dominant position, just as West Germans 
in East Germany can experience stigmatization as “Besser-Wessis” 
[“Western know-it-alls”], and find themselves in a non-dominant 
position. At the same time, the fact of being East or West German 
is not the only relevant category: categories such as age, gender, 
ability, race and ethnicity interact in complex ways. For example, 
people of colour find themselves in a marginalized position in the 
group of East Germans, but can, at the same time, belong to a 
dominant group in the group of people of colour by virtue of their 
gender or sexual orientation. Thus, very different dimensions of 
power exist in a given person and between social groups, and the 
individual dimensions can relativize or reinforce one another 
(Rommelspacher 1998: 28). “The fact that individuals are located in 
a mesh of different dominances implies that everyone is privileged 
in certain regards, and discriminated against in other regards – 
although in very different degrees” (ibid. 35).  
Such interdependencies between “dimensions of social relations 
of power, authority and normativity” are also described in terms of 
intersectionality. Characteristically, this concept observes only such 
categories as “gender, social milieu, migration background, nation, 
ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, ability, generation, etc.”3. The 
dimension of East-West differences is usually not to be found in 
such concepts. East-West is an “et cetera”, that is, a dimension 
which may possibly be relevant but is not central to this discourse. 
Although the concept of intersectionality has thus contributed little 
to an explanation of East-West dynamics up to now, its fundamental 
conception of the interdependence of individual categories is also at 
the root of the concept of dominance culture. 
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When we describe East Germans as members of the non-
dominant group in relation to West Germans as a dominant group, 
this means: 
 
1. this is not the only relevant dimension or a permanent 
disposition, and East Germans can certainly be in a dominant 
role in relation to other groups, such as immigrants; and 
2. statements are being made, not about individual persons and 
their personal experiences, but about structures and social 
groups – such statements necessarily implying analytical 
abstractions and generalizations.  
 
The concept of dominance culture combines economic, political and 
cultural dimensions, and exposes how economic and/or political 
marginalizations provoke specific cultural and/or psychological 
responses. There are two dimensions to be examined here: 
Rommelspacher (2002: 15) calls them the “horizontal axis of 
difference and the vertical axis of social inequality”. The horizontal 
axis refers to cultural distances caused by different values or 
influences. The vertical axis includes factors of structural inequality 
in society, such as income, wealth, and professional status. The two 
interact and must be considered together.  
In this model, different groups such as Saxons and Bavarians are 
not simply “different” in a horizontal plane. Rather, their difference 
is always inscribed, at the same time, with the vertical dimension of 
power, which is manifested in economic and political differences. 
Hence, groups of people are not merely different yet equal; their 
difference entails a dimension of power which privileges one side 
over the other. 
Rommelspacher (2000: 15 f., 67 ff.) herself has applied this 
concept to the German-German situation by noting that dominance 
can be observed “in statu nascendi” in German unification: “When the 
Wall fell”, she writes, “expectations of equality were at first activated 
by references to national unity, cultural community and social 
solidarity between the ‘brothers and sisters’ in East and West. With 
time, however, more and more differences were seen, which 
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resulted from the different histories, but increasingly brought with 
them asymmetric relational experiences as the new dominant 
normality was substantially determined by West Germans”. This 
concept was also used in explaining the differences between the East 
and West German women’s movements to show why the 
unification did not result in an all-German “sisterhood”, but rather 
in West German dominance and mutual exclusion (Miethe 2002, 
2005). Rommelspacher does not examine the dynamics of 
East/West German relations in-depth, however. The present essay 
does so in an attempt to demonstrate what vertical differences 
continue to exist between Eastern and Western Germany, and what 
effects they have on the horizontal plane.  
 
 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
 
On the economic level, we can observe that the standard of living 
in East Germany has risen in comparison with the period before 
1989. Incomes and pensions have also risen. The accumulation of 
assets, especially in the form of homeownership, has increased. The 
economic situation is thus on the whole significantly better than 
before 1989.  
But if we compare it, not with the time before 1989, but with the 
current situation in the West German states, the case looks different: 
although unemployment in the East has declined, it is still higher 
than in the West (2017: 7.6% in the East, 5.3% in the West; BMWi 
2017: 48). Furthermore, the reduction in the unemployment rate in 
the East correlates with a massive westward migration of the East 
German population. Thus, 1.74 million people migrated from East 
to West Germany in the period from the end of the GDR to 2006 
(Kubis/Schneider 2008). These persons, then, cease to figure in the 
East German unemployment statistics. At the same time, the 
problem ensures that the East loses mainly its young workers with 
better than average qualifications (Schneider 2005). This has 
consequences for the East German economy, and also for social 
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cohesion (e.g., older parents remain in the East whilst their children 
live in the West).  
Incomes in the East have increased, but those increases are 
concentrated in the first five years after unification: after that, 
incomes gradually stabilized at about 75% (Destatis 2015: 69) or 
83% (BMWi 2018: 50) of the Western level. At the same time, 
working hours are longer than in West Germany (Ludwig 2015: 35). 
In other words, people in the East work more for less money. This 
situation is a far cry from the traditional labour union demand for 
equal pay for equal work. Pensions too have yet to attain the 
Western level (BMWi 2018: 49). Accordingly, the average income of 
East German households is only 83% of West German households 
(Ludwig 2015: 14)4.  
Moreover, the focus on the difference in income describes only 
the “tip of the iceberg”. A look at the distribution of assets shows 
an exponentially greater difference. “The economic and social 
problems expressed in the accumulation of wealth were grossly 
underestimated from the beginning, that is, in the negotiations on 
the currency union in spring of 1990 […] and systematically 
undervalued as a defining factor in the equalization of living 
conditions of the people in East and West” (Busch 2015: 51). Under 
the socialist economy, citizens of the GDR had had fewer 
opportunities to accumulate wealth than West Germans. Although 
assets (mainly real property) have increased since the end of the 
GDR, the gap between the two halves of the country has remained 
the same (Grabka 2014: 962). The average net worth attained in East 
Germany is less than the half the Western figure (ibid. 959), and 
income from assets in East Germany is only half as great as in the 
West (Destatis 2015: 79). Of the 500 wealthiest families in Germany, 
not one lives in the new states (Busch 2015: 59).  
“Large fortunes”, writes Grabka (2014: 959), “bring with them 
economic and political power, and can be used to attain or maintain 
a high social status, or to secure advantages for children. In this way, 
they serve to form and reproduce elites”. In addition, they can be 
inherited by the next generation. The German “golden spoon 
Brolly. Journal of Social Sciences 2 (3) 2019 
49 
generation” (van Laak 2016) is primarily West German. The 
“polarization of wealth” between East and West, according to Ahbe 
(2005: 270), is “a self-reproducing structure”. At this point, if not 
before, it becomes clear that the difference between East and West 
will be carried forward into the next generation, and that this 
difference runs counter to the society’s self-image as a meritocracy.  
In view of the complexity and speed of the process of German 
unification, it was inevitable that some decisions were taken, which 
had unintended consequences. This is true of all actors involved. 
The problem, furthermore, is less the fact that social inequality exists 
(and persists) between East and West than the fact that it is 
accompanied by an idea of merit. From this point of view, the 
inferior situation of the East Germans is explained – mainly in the 
public media discourse (see below) – by a lack of productivity and 
ambition, and not by a fundamental structural disadvantage. The 
pan-German myth of a meritocracy obstructs the view of the social 
reality: that is, of a society in which different social groups start out 
with different conditions. This is true not only in regard to 
immigrants (see e.g. Foroutan et al. 2019) but also in regard to East 
Germans.  
 
 
UNEQUAL ACCESS TO ELITE POSITIONS 
 
East Germans are also marginalized in regard to access to elite 
positions. The “Potsdam elites study” of the mid-1990s found that 
“East Germans are underrepresented among the elite, measured by 
the proportions of East and West Germans in the population” 
(Bürklin, Rebenstorf et al. 1997: 65). East Germans were 
represented commensurately with their proportion of the 
population only in the field of politics. In business, they held only 
0.4% of elite positions; in the trade associations, 8.1%; in research, 
7.3%; in the military and in the judiciary, 0%. In all sectors, the 
proportion of East Germans among the elites was 11.6%, while they 
made up about 20% of the total population. This indicates that the 
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opportunities for East Germans to attain elite positions were about 
half as great as those of West Germans.  
This finding is often qualified by the remark that a substitution 
was necessary because of the ideological disqualification of GDR 
elites and that only the West German elites possessed the specialist 
knowledge (especially in law and administration) that was required 
for the reorganization of East Germany. In the meantime, however, 
a new generation has reached the age at which it might take its place 
among the elites in many sectors (Kollmorgen 2017: 61). Yet a 
current study shows that even today, East Germans are not 
proportionately represented in leadership positions. In some cases, 
instead of equalization, a retrograde development can be observed; 
in other words, the proportion of East Germans among the elites 
has become even smaller.  
This is also the case in the new states themselves. Although East 
Germans there make up about 87% of the population, only 23% of 
the elites are East German. Nationwide, only 1.7% of the top 
positions are held by East Germans. Only the federal government 
itself reflects the proportion of the East German population (cf. 
Bluhm, Jacobs 2016: 6). Even in the field of politics, in which East 
Germans did comparatively well in the Potsdam elites study, their 
standing deteriorated: in the five East German state governments, 
there are now fewer East German politicians than just a few years 
ago. The proportion of West German state secretaries (just below 
the ministerial level) increased from 26% to 46%, and only three of 
the 60 state secretaries in the federal government are East German 
(cf. Bluhm, Jacobs 2016: 6). At East German colleges and 
universities, the percentage of East German rectors has been halved. 
At the moment, no president or rector of a German university is 
from East Germany (CHE 2018)5. The proportion of East Germans 
has also declined in business, in leadership and personnel functions 
in research institutes, among presiding judges of the highest courts, 
in the media and in the military (cf. Bluhm, Jacobs 2016: 6). 
Although there are methodological differences in the definitions 
of elites or of East Germans, the basic findings of the various studies 
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on elites are not significantly different; all confirm the 
underrepresentation of East Germans at state and federal levels (cf. 
Gebauer et al. 2017: 18). Kollmorgen (2017: 58) says pointedly: 
“The higher the job classification, the less probable that it is filled 
by East Germans”. Even if “the West German dominance may have 
been unavoidable at first, nothing was done to counteract its 
perpetuation” (Köpping 2018: 105). 
The lack of representation of East Germans among Germany’s 
elites has a symbolic significance and is indeed perceived as a 
problem among East Germans. Köpping (2018: 183) refers in this 
regard to a “thorn of humiliation in the side of many East 
Germans”. The low acceptance of the West German institutions 
transferred to East Germany (Gebauer et al. 2017: 22; Vogel 2017: 
52) may also be caused in part by this situation. The situation may 
also have consequences for the following generation in view of the 
dearth of positive East German role models. If you want to succeed 
in unified Germany, the subtext of this reality says to the upcoming 
generation, you have to become West German. Being East German, 
and publicly identifying as such, is not conducive to an eminent 
career (cf. Engler, Hensel 2018: 77). 
 
 
WEST GERMAN HEGEMONIAL MEDIA DISCOURSE AND ITS EFFECTS 
 
Inequality, devaluation and stigmatization are not causally 
connected with a person’s economic situation or position in society 
as a whole but are mediated by specific social discourses. Discourses 
in the Foucauldian sense define what is sayable in the society: what 
can be said by whom, in what form, and what cannot. “In every 
society”, writes Foucault (1981: 11), “the production of discourse is 
at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed”. In this 
way, dominant interpretations prevail in negotiations of conflict in 
the society in which questions of power play an important part, and 
these interpretations influence the society in turn. The inclusion or 
exclusion of certain population groups is a part of this process. Such 
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exclusions can be quite unrelated to a person’s economic status; in 
other words, even financially well-situated persons can be 
stigmatized if they are discernible as members of a stigmatized or 
marginalized group.  
In unified Germany, hegemonial mass media discourse 
dominated by West Germans can be documented early on6. This has 
been repeatedly shown in analyses of the principal print media7 of 
unified Germany (Ahbe et al. 2006; Kollmorgen et al. 2011; Pates, 
Schochow 2013). The findings of these studies are unambiguous: 
West Germany and the West Germans are the positive norm, and 
East Germany and the East Germans deviate from it. In other 
words, rather than being different but equal, the East Germans are 
“different in the wrong way” (Pates 2013: 15). “The hegemonial 
mass media discourse on East Germany and the German 
unification”, write Kollmorgen and Hans (2011: 131), “established 
in the early 1990s had a logic of discursive subordination of the East 
Germans and East Germany, which was intensified beginning in the 
mid-1990s and partially broken and revised only from about 2005”. 
The East Germans, Ahbe too writes (2004: 21), “are attributed those 
properties that the West Germans – in their own self-image – have 
succeeded in casting off: authoritarianism and obedient 
irresponsibility, xenophobia, racism and indifference towards 
National Socialism”. The fundamental logic of these depictions is 
that individuals are equated with a system: the West Germans come 
from a democratic system, ergo they are democratic; the East 
Germans come from a totalitarian system, ergo they are totalitarian. 
The discourse ignores individual spheres and strategies of action 
that people can develop even under totalitarian conditions.  
This “contrast to ‘normal’ Germans” illustrates that “there’s 
something wrong with the ‘Ossis’” (ibid. 9). The terms “Ossi” and 
“Wessi” are thus “asymmetric, such that ‘Ossi’ plays the part of the 
‘marked’ term, a term which has the function of explaining an 
individual’s actions by his ‘nature’, designating them as abnormal in 
contrast to the unmarked opposite term ‘Wessi’” (ibid.). Although 
this hegemonial discourse has been somewhat disrupted in recent 
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years (Kollmorgen, Hans 2011: 136), the texts in Pates (2013) 
demonstrate that a positive image of East Germans was portrayed 
mainly when the purpose was to impose unpopular neoliberal 
reforms. Little has changed in the fundamental logic of the 
characterizations: “East Germans are portrayed as decidedly 
abnormal in constant comparison with West Germans” (ibid. 15). 
In this way, “social differences are naturalized” by being 
“represented as natural results of a group’s specific properties” (ibid. 
17 f.). All of the social inequalities described here become the results 
of the East Germans’ wrong actions and wrong thinking – and thus 
social conflicts are personalized as specific to the group. The 
dominance of this kind is not limited to the media discourse, 
however, but permeates the everyday lives of East Germans, not 
least because the media discourse has strong echoes in day-to-day 
life. Petra Köpping (2018) has emphatically pointed out this 
circumstance in her book Integriert doch erst mal uns! [“First integrate 
us!”]. She describes the experiences – mainly situated in the 1990s – 
of “unresolved humiliation, insults and injustices” that continue to 
affect the East Germans today, “regardless of whether they 
succeeded in making their way after 1990 or not” (ibid. 9). All 
criticism of the Western system or the process of German 
unification was quickly disqualified as that of “whining Ossis”, 
“losers of the transition” or “GDR nostalgia” (ibid. 69). Everything 
that preceded 1989 “became a footnote, ancient history, ballast” 
(ibid. 70). Another line of criticism cites socialization in the GDR to 
derive a specific collectivistic structure of social behaviour from it. 
Characteristically, or frighteningly, the numerous 
autobiographical novels by young East German authors8 associate 
the basic fact of growing up under the conditions which devalue 
their own East German background with the desire to leave those 
experiences behind them. At the same time, this experience seems 
to shape a multi-generational East German identity: Jana Hensel 
(*1976) and Wolfgang Engler (*1952) are unanimous in describing 
their experience of “Ossi-bashing” and their perception of “cultural 
marginalization” (Engler, Hensel 2018: 31-35). The East German 
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identity narrative, according to Jana Hensel, “remains the deficient, 
the subordinate, the marginalized one, and often simply that which 
is completely overlooked. In any case, it is one which is far from 
being included in a unified German identity narrative” (ibid. 57). 
 
 
THE SUBTLE MECHANISMS OF DOMINANCE AND ITS REPRODUCTION 
 
In theory, the democratic principle of equality is applicable equally 
to all social groups – to West and East Germans just as much as to 
immigrants and their descendants. When newly arrived groups 
demand equality, however, “competition” (Foroutan et al. 2019: 42) 
inevitably results. “Participation in power”, Rommelspacher (1998: 
33) writes, “means not just privilege, but also the struggle to 
maintain privileges. In this struggle, the participants in power must 
assert their claims both towards the competitors and towards the 
victims of discrimination and must maintain at least the appearance 
of legitimacy. And ultimately, they must also justify that claim to 
themselves. This is only possible if they personally meet certain 
expectations and reject competing motives”. Thus, Rommelspacher 
describes the psychological mechanisms that members of dominant 
and non-dominant groups develop in order to realize their 
respective interests – namely, the preservation of privileges and 
participation in power. The ensuing actions and decisions are not 
premeditated; rather, these mechanisms are deeply internalized, 
subtle, and usually not intentional on the part of the people 
involved. Rommelspacher describes several such mechanisms. 
Because these are useful for understanding the relationship between 
East and West, I will present them briefly here. 
 
Denial of Inequality and Conservation of Privilege 
 
The self-image of modern societies, Rommelspacher (1998: 30) 
writes, involves a “denial of inequality”. This results from the 
interest, whether conscious or not, of the dominant group or groups 
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in preserving their own dominance. No special measures are 
required; the conservation of privilege is “reproduced primarily by 
the maintenance of normality and not by conscious (…) intentional 
action.” (Rommelspacher 1998: 32; emphasis in the original).  
Very simple examples may suffice to illustrate this. One such 
example is the birth year books made by the publishing house 
Wartenberg. These books are widely distributed in Germany and are 
sold not only in bookshops but also in gift shops and the like. Titled 
Wir vom Jahrgang XXXX [“We who were born in the year XXXX”], 
these books compile the influential events from the childhood and 
adolescence of a specific cohort. Originally, none of these birth-year 
books so much mentioned the diverging life reality and experience 
of those who grew up in the East. The publisher has recently 
expanded the series, and now offers the books with a subtitle, “Born 
in the GDR”. The GDR is thus a special circumstance calling for 
special mention. The original series does not bear any subtitle such 
as “Born in West Germany”. The simple “we” of the title refers to 
West Germans. This example illustrates that the “maintenance of 
normality” is the maintenance of the West Germans’ day-to-day 
reality – even 30 years after the German unification.  
There is no need to change anything about the society; newly 
arriving social groups such as immigrants or East Germans must 
integrate themselves inconspicuously in the existing social order. It 
is tacitly assumed that the upper tiers are already occupied by the 
dominant groups, and the lower tiers are reserved for the new 
arrivals. As a rule, it is left to the non-dominant groups to point out 
their lack of social representation, their economically inferior 
situation, and their unequal opportunities. Their doing so disturbs 
the social status quo, in which the members of the dominant groups 
are privileged.  
A mechanism that can develop here is the denial of real social 
inequality by members of the dominant groups. Such a denial serves 
to preserve their privileges. This mechanism is difficult to be 
observed since the members of dominant groups are usually not 
conscious of their own privileges. To them, the social status quo is 
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simply “normal”. Because the “acceptance of their own role by 
members of dominant groups” is difficult, Rommelspacher (1998: 
185) writes that they have a “denied identity”. 
The denial of their privilege over East Germans seems to be very 
strong among West Germans. In a current study, Foroutan et al. 
(2019) have examined East and West Germans’ attitudes towards 
each other and towards Muslim immigrants. In regard to West 
Germans’ perception of East Germans, they found that West 
Germans “hardly take the East Germans’ feeling of deprivation 
seriously” (Foroutan et al. 2019: 22). The structural discrimination 
of East Germans described above is hardly acknowledged by West 
Germans. While almost half of East Germans (49.1%) agree with 
the statement that “East Germans must make greater efforts than 
West Germans to obtain equal rewards”, that opinion is shared by 
less than a third of West Germans (29.6%). East Germans’ limited 
access to elite positions is perceived by more than a third (37.3%) 
of East Germans, but only by less than a fifth of West Germans 
(18.6%). 
Foroutan et al. (2019: 37) summarize their findings thus: “West 
Germans do not recognize the situation of East Germans to a 
comparable degree. Thus, they ignore the wounds of the 
Reunification”. Interestingly, the deprivation of Muslims is 
recognized by both East and West Germans to an almost equal 
degree. Such a finding permits the inference that West Germans are 
much less conscious of the structural discrimination of East 
Germans than of that of Muslim immigrants. The shared language 
and the centuries of shared cultural background apparently obscure 
their sight of the structural inequalities which have formed over 45 
years of divided history and 30 years of unification under a 
dominance culture. Another identifiable pattern is the denial or 
trivialization of the persistent inequality between East and West. 
This can occur by means of an exclusive focus on the progress of 
incomes to the exclusion of wealth, for example (cf. Busch 2015). 
But it may also occur through an excessive emphasis on regional 
differences. As gratifying as it may be to observe that a region such 
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as Saxony, in the East, is viewed as comparable with the Ruhr area 
in the West, it is problematic that fundamental disparities between 
East and West are thus obscured. Without a doubt, there do exist 
regional differences, North-South differences, and typical problems 
of metropolitan areas in contrast to rural ones. These lines of 
contrast are often oblique to the persistent disparity between East 
and West. Such comparisons, however, focus only on one individual 
factor, such as economic growth. Yet East-West differences are 
determined by a cumulation of the dimensions described above. 
Since the unification, East Germans have made the negative 
experiences of non-representation among elites; of finding their 
issues underrepresented or negatively distorted in the unified 
German media discourse; of stigmatization and devaluation whose 
existence is at the same time denied; of working longer while 
attaining lower incomes and wealth. Precisely this cumulation of 
disadvantages – although of course not all of the factors mentioned 
must coincide in every case – must be taken into account in order 
to perceive and grasp the inequality between East and West as a 
structural and multi-generational problem. As described above, 
there is a real, quantifiable social inequality between East and West 
Germans. The economic discrimination of East Germans and their 
lack of representation among the elites are not subjective feelings, 
but findings supported by empirical data. This inequality is largely 
denied and ignored by West Germans, however, and reinterpreted 
as an unjustified subjective feeling on the part of East Germans. “In the 
West”, writes Richter (2018: 38), “the stereotype of the ungrateful, 
malcontent Ossi has taken root” (see also the findings of Foroutan 
et al. 2919: 37). 
 
Displacement and Reversal of the Problem 
 
Another mechanism of imposing dominance described by 
Rommelspacher (1998: 176 f.) is the displacement and reversal of a 
problem. In problem displacement, the focus is placed not on the real 
problems – in this case, economic and cultural discrimination – but 
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on their consequences. In other words, critical analysis is brought to 
bear not on the problems in the society, such as mass 
unemployment resulting from drastic reorganization, a 
comprehensive transformation affecting all areas of life, and a 
hegemonic discourse of devaluation of the East, but on an allegedly 
inadequate response on the part of those affected by such changes. 
An illustrative example is the “post-traumatic embitterment 
disorder” (PTED), which psychotherapists have diagnosed in East 
Germans (Linden 2003). This disorder is caused in otherwise 
healthy subjects by a traumatizing experience: the East German 
transition. The problem is seen not in massive processes of 
transformation such as people have rarely been forced to undergo, 
nor in a lack of appreciation and respect in unified Germany, but in 
the deficient ability of the East Germans to cope. East Germans are 
seen to exhibit “abnormal behaviour” (ibid. 196) – but not a word 
is said about any “abnormality” of the social transformation with its 
consequences and upheavals.  
Problem reversal goes a step further. “It not only shifts the 
problems onto the weaker party but, at the same time, holds that 
party responsible for the problems. The existing hierarchies of 
power are replaced by an opposite hierarchy of responsibility” 
(Rommelspacher 1998: 177). Thus, minorities are held responsible 
for the fact that the majority has problems. This perspective 
continues to dominate the perception of East Germans and East 
Germany today. “The East” and “the East Germans” are the 
problem to be solved – not the West German economic system, 
mistakes made in the unification, or the process of transformation. 
In general, only East Germany is talked about, while West Germany 
is not under discussion. The West German “problems which would 
call for a joint assessment and analysis mutate under West German 
discursive hegemony into inexhaustible evidence of the 
backwardness of the East” (Engler, Hensel 2018: 134). 
When behaviour occurs in East Germany that would, without a 
doubt, merit criticism, such as xenophobic or racist violence, no 
causes are sought, no narrow definition of the circle of persons 
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involved is sought; rather, the East Germans are generalized as an 
“enraged mob” which, oscillating “between self-pity and barbarity”, 
“tends towards acts of racist and xenophobic violence” (Bittermann 
1993). Meanwhile, the xenophobic and racist violence which, in fact, 
occurs in West Germany too is not used to derive general traits of 
West Germans. Right-wing extremism is “thus no longer a 
fundamental social problem”, but is “located primarily in the East” 
(Pates 2013: 18).  
This displacement of the problem to East Germany goes hand 
in hand with a trivialization of the extent of racism and xenophobia, 
and although xenophobia can be documented to a greater degree in 
the East than in West Germany, it does exist in the West as well (cf. 
Zick, Küpper 2016: 94 ff.). Thus, the East must serve as the 
scapegoat for current problems. East Germans’ appreciation of their 
own East German roots and influences is no more welcome 
(“ostalgia”) than criticism of the Western system (“whining”). The 
East is the problem, once and for all – the West may have a problem 
with the East, but is in no way a part of the problem itself (for a 
critical view, see Köpping 2018: 69 ff.; Engler, Hensel 2018: 29). 
 
Internalization of Dominance and Discrimination  
 
The “denied identity” of the dominant group corresponds with a 
“rejected identity” on the part of the marginalized group 
(Rommelspacher 1998: 184). Thus, the “negotiation of identities 
and positions of power” is very difficult, since “the opposite party 
is difficult to pin down” (ibid.). “Rejected identity” means that the 
dominant groups declare the cultural influences and experiences of 
the non-dominant groups to be irrelevant. This was clearly visible in 
the process of German unification, which was not taken as an 
opportunity for reforms necessary in a united Germany, but as an 
application of the West German system (with few exceptions) to 
East Germany. East German models or proposals from the civil 
rights movements of autumn of 1989 were dismissed, unexamined, 
as unsuitable by definition for a unified Germany. This 
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marginalization of the GDR heritage is reflected in the history 
curriculum as well, in which the GDR is insufficiently included 
(Arnswald 2004). The personal stories and life experiences of East 
Germans were also massively devalued after 1990 (cf. Köpping 
(2018). 
In such circumstances, it is not easy for members of socially 
stigmatized groups to accept and assert their own group 
membership since it is “often enough associated with social 
discrimination” (Rommelspacher 1998: 181). A typical strategy for 
coping with this situation is assimilation. This refers to the rejection 
of one’s own stigmatized group and the internalization of the values 
and norms of the dominant group. This may not even be seen as a 
problem since democratic values are certainly more worthy of 
emulation than those of a dictatorship. The problem here, however, 
is that life in the GDR cannot be reduced to the experience of 
dictatorship: even under conditions of totalitarianism, people 
develop strategies of autonomous action, and there were in fact 
“limits to the dictatorship” (Bessel, Jessen 1996). An identity 
problem for people of East German backgrounds results when 
precisely these experiences are considered irrelevant and have no 
place in a unified Germany. East Germans, who identify with these 
origins and experiences, risk being stigmatized and devalued. The 
price of assimilation is the abandonment of one’s original 
background and identity.  
Examples can be found in recent East German literature and in 
public proclamations. Jana Hensel, for example, writes about her 
childhood and youth in the GDR: “Perhaps later, when I tell my 
children about our youth, I will simply pretend it began at the age 
of 22; perhaps I will summarily erase those first unsure, ugly years 
from our lives” (Hensel 2002: 60). What Hensel describes here is 
the anticipated denial of her GDR identity, since her experience is 
that experiences of the GDR do not fit in the unified German 
discourse under West German hegemony. The danger of being 
misunderstood and negatively interpreted or exoticized is too great. 
The denial of one’s identity inevitably leads to individualization 
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of the problem, since identification with the group results in social 
stigmatization. “To be openly East German, to bear prominent 
witness to the paradoxical experiences that are one’s heritage from 
that country, required courage. To deny that experience, to keep 
silent about it”, Engler writes, “was more promising for one’s 
career” (Engler, Hensel 2018: 77). 
Thus, if East Germans publicly cease to see East-West problems, 
this need does not imply that the problems do not exist. It is just as 
likely that they have learned – not least out of self-defence – to keep 
quiet about such issues in public (cf. Miethe, Ely 2016). This silence 
about one’s background, history and identity eventually has the 
effect that the succeeding generation can hardly grasp its origins. 
The fact that young people who knew the GDR only as children or 
adolescents have joined together in an initiative called “Third 
Generation East” (Hacker et al. 2012) is an indication of the 
necessity of finding a space in which they can talk about their 
influences. This initiative also shows, however, that it is possible to 
do so in a democratic Germany. 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
In sum, we find that the differences which are still to be found today 
between East and West Germans are not explainable simply by their 
socialization before 1989. Rather, those differences result primarily 
from experiences in the process of German unification, the process 
of transformation, and the current situation in Germany. It is 
important here to change our perspective – both in the academic 
discourse and in public discussion.  
There are no easy solutions, since some of the problems 
described here, such as the enormous disparity in wealth, can hardly 
be solved politically – at least, not by means that are legal in a 
democracy. The media too will hardly accept instructions as to how 
they should write about different population groups. We might 
make the demand, however, that a minimum of political correctness 
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must be observed in reporting on East Germans. Other problems, 
such as the underrepresentation of East Germans among elites, for 
example, could be solved. This would require taking the problem 
seriously in the first place and forming a political will to change it.  
But that would depend in turn on perceiving the relations of 
dominance between East and West, and defining them as a problem 
of all Germans – not just the Ossis’ problem. The developments after 
1989 are shared German history, which in East Germany has been 
strongly influenced by West German elites. The mistakes and the 
unintended consequences in this process must be addressed as 
much as the successes and dealt with by East and West jointly. In 
this light, the history of the process of German unification and the 
subsequent transformation of East Germany is not finished, but 
more topical than ever, and its appraisal should be considered a 
project of all Germany. 
 
 
NOTES 
1. It is often rightly pointed out that the assignment to one of these two 
categories is not a simple matter. In the present article, I follow Bluhm and 
Jacobs (2015: 4) who, with reference to Kollmorgen (2015: 20), call those 
persons “East German” who grew up in the GDR up to 1990, and who 
spent most of their lives there (regardless of their present domicile), and 
those persons born in the GDR or the new states after 1975, whose 
environment ensured an “East German” socialization. 
2. Rommelspacher’s use of the term “Western” does not refer to an East-West 
difference, but to the Eurocentric perspective, which is shared by the 
Eastern part of Europe. The line of conflict opened here between Western 
(Eurocentric) countries and the global South is oblique to the present East-
West topic, and cannot be further examined in this article. For clarity, I will 
prefer here the terms “dominant” and “non-dominant” and that of “modern 
society” in order to avoid misunderstandings and false equivalences with the 
global discourse. 
3. From the self-concept page of a German web portal on intersectionality, 
“Portal Intersektionalität”, http://portal-intersektionalitaet.de/konzept/ 
(accessed 27 October 2019). 
4. These findings are sometimes qualified with the argument that the cost of 
living is also lower in the East than in the West. However, prices have by 
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now largely equalized in East and West (Vortmann et al. 2013). 
5. http://www.che.de/downloads/CHECK_Universitaetsleitung_in_Deutsc
hland.pdf. 
6. A distinction between Eastern and Western media in this connection is not 
relevant. The publishing world of the GDR succumbed to a massive process 
of contraction after 1989 (cf. Links 2016), and the East German newspaper 
market was rapidly divided up among the West German publishers (cf. 
Bahrmann 2005). The few small publishers under East German 
management play only a marginal role in the unified German discourse. 
7. The studies cited in the following mainly analyzed periodicals such as 
Frankfurter Allgmeine Zeitung (FAZ), Die Welt, Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), BZ, Der 
Spiegel, Stern, Die Zeit, and television news programs and political magazine 
formats in the public networks ARD and ZDF (cf. Kollmorgen, Hans 2011: 
136). 
8. Autobiographical novels tend to be written at an older age. The fact that 
remarkably many young East Germans engage with their biographical 
experience of the post-unification period in particular is an indication of the 
topicality and relevance of the subject. 
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